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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3046 
___________ 
 
STEVEN A. JOHNSON, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1:16-cv-00305) 
District Judge:  Hon. John E. Jones III 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 18, 2016 
 
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  September 12, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Steven A. Johnson appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Johnson is a federal inmate currently incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg in 
Pennsylvania.  In February 2016, Johnson filed a habeas petition purporting to raise three 
claims:  (1) “Refused BP-8 and BP-9”; (2) “refused legal call”; and (3) “refused 
grooming product (razor).”  ECF 1, pp. 6-7.1  He requested injunctive relief, and for the 
District Court to “uphold [the] rights and policy of [the] inmate handbook.”  ECF 1, p. 8.  
The requested injunction was described by Johnson in a separate motion attached to his 
habeas petition.  See ECF 1, p. 14 (seeking transfer “to a prison willing [to] honor First 
Amendment rights of accessing courts and policies of the inmate handbook”). 
 The District Court screened Johnson’s petition pursuant to the Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, see 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 
(1977), made applicable to § 2241 petitions by Rule 1(b).  Bowers v. U.S. Parole 
Comm’n, Warden, 760 F.3d 1177, 1183 n.8 (11th Cir. 2014).  The District Court 
summarily dismissed Johnson’s petition—and, by necessary implication, the motion for 
injunctive relief—because his claims did not challenge “either the fact or duration of his 
confinement.”  ECF 5, p. 2.  The District Court reasoned that habeas corpus is not an 
                                              
1 The first claim appears to implicate the grievance policy maintained by the U.S. Bureau 
of Prisons.  In an addendum to his petition, Johnson vaguely explained that he was 
“denied a BP-8/BP-9”—presumably a reference to the forms for filing a grievance and an 
administrative appeal—in order to address his phone and razor issues.  See ECF 1, p. 10.  
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appropriate vehicle for an inmate seeking to impose liability for constitutional violations 
related to conditions of confinement.  The District Court dismissed Johnson’s petition 
“without prejudice to any right [he] may have to reassert his present claims in a properly 
filed civil rights complaint.”  ECF 5, p. 2; see also ECF 6.  Johnson appealed.           
II. 
 As noted above, the District Court dismissed Johnson’s habeas petition without 
prejudice to his re-raising the claims in a separate civil rights action.  Generally, an order 
dismissing an action without prejudice is not immediately appealable.  Borelli v. City of 
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).  Here, however, the District 
Court’s use of the term “without prejudice” was simply meant to convey to Johnson that, 
although his claims were not cognizable under § 2241, he could assert his claims anew in 
a Bivens-style2 action.  A new lawsuit would be required (if desired) because the non-
cognizability of Johnson’s claims under § 2241 constituted a defect that could not be 
remedied by amendment.  See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1995).  The District Court’s order of dismissal thus terminated the litigation and was 
immediately appealable.  See id. 
 Consequently, we exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review is plenary.  Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per 
                                              
 
2 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
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curiam).  We may summarily affirm if there is no substantial question presented by the 
appeal.  See Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.     
III. 
 Because Johnson’s habeas petition challenged only conditions of his confinement, 
the District Court properly dismissed the action below.  Section 2241 “confers habeas 
jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity 
but the execution of his sentence.”  Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 
(3d Cir. 2005).  In Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), we explained that, in 
order for a prisoner to challenge the “execution” of his sentence under § 2241, he must 
allege that the “[Federal Bureau of Prisons’] conduct was somehow inconsistent with a 
command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment.”  Id. at 537; see also Leamer 
v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002).  The claims raised in Johnson’s § 2241 
petition are unrelated to his sentence and are thus non-cognizable under Cardona.  
Therefore, the District Court did not err in dismissing the case.3    
                                              
 
3  Johnson’s reliance on Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), to avoid this result is 
unavailing.  In Preiser, the Supreme Court commented in passing that “[w]hen a prisoner 
is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is 
arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.  
Id. at 499; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 n.6 (1979) (leaving “to another day 
the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the 
conditions of confinement.”).  The Supreme Court, though, has “never followed [that] 
speculation in [Preiser].”  Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 n.1 (2004) (per 
curiam).  Instead, it has identified only two claim varieties that may be pursued with a 
habeas petition:  “[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars 
affecting its duration.”  Id. at 750.  But even assuming, contra Muhammad and Cardona, 
5 
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s order of dismissal will be 
summarily affirmed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
that a habeas petition can in certain cases be used to challenge conditions of confinement 
unrelated to an inmate’s conviction or sentence, we are skeptical that deprivation of a 
shaving razor and a phone call amounts to the “additional and unconstitutional restraints” 
hypothesized by the Supreme Court in Preiser. 
